In 1975, a posthumous collection of the writings of Yaacov Herzog, a former Israeli ambassador to Canada, was published with the title A People That Dwells Alone. The title was borrowed from the "blessing" pronounced by Balaam in his failed effort to curse the Jewish people as they approached the Promised Land. It points to the lot so frequently faced by the State of Israel then and now. In light of the National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iran's nuclear threat, it appears that the State of Israel may once again be facing a potential existential threat alone.

Some analysts have called this NIE the most unintelligent report they have ever seen. Others have observed that it is the most transparently political work presented by a presumably nonpolitical agency. Regardless of the quality of the work or the reasons that it was presented at this time, there are some extraordinary conclusions that must be drawn by anyone judging its release and implications.

How could the United States have made such an incorrect intelligence analysis for so long, and how did it suddenly come to this huge epiphany? Can one be sure that the U.S. intelligence community has it right this time? What might actually have taken place within the American intelligence community? Who is at risk if this intelligence estimate is faulty, and what might be done, and by whom, if this analysis also is wrong?

Finally, what might be the consequences of a newly defined focus by the Bush administration during its final 14 months in office as it seeks to avoid another foreign policy fiasco?

It is irrefutable that the U.S. intelligence community possesses the most sophisticated hi-tech intelligence gathering operation in the world; but in some parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, it has the worst human intelligence gathering operation imaginable. Getting it right and yet getting it wrong suggests inadequate corroborative information on the ground. This spawns political infighting and finger-pointing.

The Pentagon is tired of a failed war in Iraq, fought on the cheap without enough soldiers and proper equipment. The State Department, finally winning the battle to negotiate with Iran, did not want any new military initiatives. The intelligence agencies are even more bureaucratized and no more effective than before their 9/11 fiascos. They were totally embarrassed as recently as this summer when the Israelis informed them that a site that the United States had under surveillance for years in northern Syria was, apparently unbeknownst to the Americans, engaged in the early stages of production of a nuclear weapon.

Assuming that the new NIE is correct, what does this report say about the gross failures of the U.S. intelligence agencies for the past four years? Either the Iranians have been brilliant in deceiving the United States and the West, or all the supersophisticated hi-tech surveillance information still totally misread the Iranians' intentions. To reverse its judgment so radically suggests at best a broken intelligence system and at worst a critical national security bureaucracy out of control and overrun by political lifeguards trying to save the Bush administration from drowning in foreign policy follies. One need not be a nuclear physicist to conclude that a nation does not need more than 3,000 gaseous centrifuges to produce sufficient fissionable material to power nuclear reactors.

While most would agree that a diplomatic solution to Iran's potential nuclear saber rattling is highly preferable to a military confrontation, it is curious that not only Israel but also the British, the French, the Germans, and especially the Saudis and the Gulf states appear to be skeptical of the new NIE report.

Clearly, the United States is tired of war. The timing of this intelligence revelation by the Bush administration may be a response to isolationist voices being heard on the Republican campaign trail. The administration's shift is already now the subject of high-level talks between the United States and Israel, and will no doubt be a major item of discussion when Bush makes his first trip to Israel in early January.

Further, Israel may have its strongest ally in the Saudis. King Abdullah and the sheikhs must measure how aggressive is Iran's desire for regional dominance now and how achievable is Iran's desire to take over Iraqi petroleum reserves while dangling a nuclear sword. Such an assessment, with its potential economic consequences for the West, may make the strongest case for an American reevaluation of Iranian activities.

Israel cannot afford "mistakes" by its allies, especially when they pose an existential threat. They need to refocus the United States on Iran's nuclear ambitions despite the new assessment, persuade other nations to keep the economic pressure on Tehran, and harness the Saudis' overwhelming self-interest. Time is fleeting.