An unfortunate perception exists among a number of mainstream opinion-makers that Jewish organizations — AIPAC, for example — and neoconservatives (many of whom are Jewish) were the driving force behind the unnecessary invasion of Iraq. As the drumbeats grow louder for taking military action against Iran, those same voices again can be heard charging that Jews are promoting war on behalf of Israel.

Although Trita Parsi, who teaches international relations at Johns Hopkins University and is president of the National Iranian American Council, notes that Israel supported the war only after the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq, he contends that Israel is actively urging the United States to attack Iran before it acquires a nuclear weapon. He argues that Israel is promoting a confrontation with Iran not just because of its security concerns but also because the Jewish state views Tehran as an obstacle to its hegemonic economic and military objectives in the region. Parsi maintains that Israel believes that it is in its interest to weaken Iran in the world community. It does so, he says, by portraying Iran as a country ruled by an irrational leadership that is willing to "martyr" millions of its own people if this would result in Israel's destruction.

Parsi holds that it is Israel's aim to convince the United States and the West that a nuclear bomb in the hands of Iran's "mad mullahs" would result in a catastrophic war; by succeeding, Israel would isolate its regional rival in the world community and regain its value as a strategic ally of the United States. Israel's status was diminished following the end of the Cold War and was dramatically on display during the Gulf War, when it was not only excluded from the coalition that countered Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait but was strongly cautioned by the United States not to retaliate even after Iraq launched 39 Scud missiles against the Jewish state.

According to Parsi, what Israel fears even more than a militarily powerful Iran is a rapprochement between Iran and the United States, which would leave the Jewish state without strategic value to its primary ally and would compromise its ambitious regional objectives.

Parsi argues that since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran — rather than sacrificing its national interest for extremist ideological goals — has in fact used the rhetoric of religion to achieve pragmatic national interest objectives. Thus, rather than an irrational leadership that promises paradise to its followers in the event of a nuclear attack against Israel or the United States, Parsi contends, geopolitical considerations weigh more heavily than Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric consistently calling for Israel's destruction. Iran believes its size, population, educational level, and natural oil resources ordain its leadership role in the Middle East. It is this consideration, states Parsi, rather than religious fanaticism, that continues to be the driving force of Iranian foreign policy. Consequently, Parsi agrees with those who hold that if the United States were to accept and safeguard Iran's regional interest in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, a rapprochement between both countries would be a real possibility.

The author cites a document that has only recently come to light to support his argument. On April 9, 2003, only three weeks into the invasion of Iraq, Tehran reached out to the Bush administration with a comprehensive proposal that addressed all points of contention between them. Among its concessions, Iran offered to end its support of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and to pressure them to cease attacks against Israel. In addition, Iran's leadership promised to support the disarmament of Hizbullah, Iran's own creation, and turn it into a purely political party.

On the nuclear issue, the proposal included Iran's offer to open up its nuclear program completely to "intrusive international inspection in order to alleviate any fears of Iranian weaponization." And regarding terrorism, the mullahs offered full cooperation against all terrorist organizations, including Al Qaida. Most surprisingly, Iran agreed to accept the Saudi peace plan of 2002, wherein the Arab states offered to normalize relations and make peace collectively with Israel; in return Israel would agree to withdraw from all the occupied territories, accept a fully independent Palestinian state, divide Jerusalem equally, and equitably resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. With the execution of this process, states Parsi, "Iran would formally recognize the two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel."

The most significant concession sought by Iran was to reach a long-term understanding with the United States that would put a halt to hostile American behavior, as exemplified by President Bush's "Axis of Evil" rhetoric.

In addition, America would cease its interference in domestic Iranian affairs, end all U.S. sanctions, respect Iranian national interests in Iraq, support Iranian demands for reparations resulting from the eight-year war waged against them by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, and, most importantly, respect Iran's right to full access to nuclear, biological, and chemical technology. Washington would also recognize Iran's legitimate security interests in the region. The proposal also provided for step-by-step negotiations toward a mutually acceptable agreement.

The Iranian offer came when the United States was celebrating the "Mission Accomplished" phase of its Iraqi invasion. Hardliners in the Bush administration interpreted Iran's proposal as a sign of weakness, resulting in the hubristic administration's rejection of the offer, because, they said, "America could get what it wanted for free by simply removing the regime in Tehran…. Why talk to Iran when you could simply dictate terms from a position of strength." An opportunity for a breakthrough with Iran had been willfully wasted and, as Parsi notes, "many former Bush administration officials admit that the non-response was a mistake."

Israel, states Parsi, not only opposed the Iranian offer, but was the prime beneficiary of the Bush administration's rejection of the proposal. He argues that Israel feared a thaw in the relationship between Iran and the United States and that Israel strove to drive a wedge between those two countries. Parsi charges that Jewish organizations, AIPAC for one, joined by neoconservatives, moved to demonize the Islamic Republic and brought about the present crisis situation between the United States and Iran.

For Parsi, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not the primary obstacle to stability in the Middle East; it is, rather, the enmity between the two regional powers, Iran and Israel. Parsi cites a 2004 report that Israeli intelligence handed to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that argued that Israel had an inherent right to preemption because Arab and Iranian leaders are irrational and do not value self-preservation. The report concluded that anything less than overwhelming Israeli superiority in the region would constitute an existential threat to the Jewish state because if "the neighbors gain the military upper hand they will destroy Israel."

Parsi bemoans the fact that the policies of both Israel and the Bush administration rest on the assumption that Iran is governed by religious fanatics committed to Israel's destruction, rather than a leadership governed by "realpolitik." Parsi admits, however, that any Israeli government must operate on a worst-case scenario and that to assume that Iranian threats to destroy Israel are merely rhetoric and that its leadership is governed by rational political considerations is a great risk to take.

The Holocaust has taught us that words have consequences. Had the world taken Hitler's Mein Kampf seriously, six million and more Jews would be alive today. Parsi may be right about the threats emanating from Tehran being mere rhetoric, but contemporary Jewish history requires that Israel take the Iranian rhetoric of destruction seriously.