Advertisement
August 27, 2009
There are several standing rules in high-level diplomacy and the conduct of bilateral relations: There can be no surprises, concluding declarations or statements are virtually agreed upon before the visit, and both sides must depart from the meeting being able to suggest that they achieved something.
It is in that context that one needs to consider the visit of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to Washington in mid-August. The Mubarak visit had many potential goals, but beyond the symbolism and the photo opportunities, it remains unclear what had changed in the two months since Mubarak and President Obama had last met in Cairo.
Assuming that Mubarak was not also coming to the States for medical treatment (which did not appear to be the case), why did an 81-year-old leader make the trip? What was the real agenda and what might it say about Egypt’s role in the region?
The following are some of the recent developments and factors that need to considered:
1. Egypt permitted Israeli warships to sail through the Suez Canal in mid-July. While such activities — including the passage of Israeli submarines — have occurred before, there appears to be a more regular flow of organized Israeli warship traffic through the canal.
2. Egypt-Israel relations appear to be improving — despite Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s hostile verbal attack on Mubarak.
3. Egypt has become significantly more concerned about potential Iranian-backed, radical Hizbullah activity in Egypt.
4. Egypt fears a growing Iranian regional threat, which in turn has prompted Egypt to seek “unofficial” coordination with the Israelis regarding ways to address this threat.
5. Mubarak appears to have begun to address seriously his own mortality and is seeking to assure that his son, Gamal Mubarak, 45, will be his successor. Gamal came to the United States in the spring for a series of private meetings and accompanied his father to Washington, although he holds only a position in the National Democratic Party and not in the Egyptian government. His likely rival for succession is rumored to be Omar Suleiman, the director of the Egyptian Security Services. Hosni Mubarak would like to ensure U.S., as well as Israeli, support should his son’s succession be contested.
6. There are clear indications from Israel that the Egyptians have been actively engaged in trying to facilitate the release of Gilad Shalit from his Hamas captors.
7. Egypt appears to be working with the Israelis to restrict the flow of arms through the Philadelphi tunnels to Hamas in Gaza. Despite some minor incidents between the IDF and Egyptian forces on the border, there remains an apparent joint effort to block the Iran-sourced, Sudan-transferred, and Egyptian-smuggled weapons from getting into terrorist hands in Gaza.
8. Mubarak appears to be willing to intercede with the Saudis and to encourage them to move away from their current position, which includes withholding confidence-building measures with the Israelis until Israel accepts the Saudi peace proposal in toto. The carrot in this would be to give the Israelis potentially better tactical positioning to address the Iranian nuclear threat hovering over the entire Gulf region.
The question is: For how many of these issues would Mubarak have flown to Washington — unless more of the initiative for his visit came from what the Obama administration had to report to or ask of the Egyptians.
As has become apparent over the past few weeks, there has been significant change — at least in nuance and rhetoric — in relations between the United States and Israel. First, the tone of dialogue between Washington and Jerusalem has improved following the apparent springtime contretemps.
Second, the United States and Israel have apparently come to an understanding on the issue of the settlement freeze, at least temporarily.
Third, there appears to be a possibility that the Netanyahu government and the Palestinian Authority will resume peace talks — soon.
Finally, in light of the Iranian election, instability in that country may well enable the United States to develop a broader coalition of forces to impose serious, economic sanctions or boycotts on Iran should it not make significant progress in restricting its nuclear weapons program. The Obama administration would like the Egyptians to carry this message back to the region.
The U.S. strategy may be more subtle. Washington hopes to split the Egyptians from the obstinate, hard-line, anti-Israel line of the Saudis — an uncompromising stance that apparently shocked the Obama administration during their Middle East visit. They need the Egyptians’ support with respect to the peace process and the Iranian nuclear threat. The United States also needs the Egyptians to respect the Obama administration’s shift in strategy in dealing with the Syrians.
Finally, they might even be searching with the Egyptians for a mutually advantageous way to develop a comprehensive regional approach to Iran. If there was movement on any of these fronts, in addition to the pluses that Mubarak himself got from the trip, then this second round of meetings may well have been worthwhile.
Dr. Gilbert N. Kahn is a professor of political science at Kean University in Union (gkahn@kean.edu).
Comment: comments@njjewishnews.com
--TOP--