Can all the recent "motion" surrounding the Arab-Israel conflict lead to any positive ends?

President Bush has dispatched both his secretary of state and secretary of defense to the Middle East to meet this week with many — but definitely not all — of the various governments and players in the region. Previously, the president, in the name of the Quartet, had announced that he was calling for all parties engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict to meet in Washington in September. Bush was then instrumental in convincing former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to undertake the role of primary negotiator or at least facilitator for the Quartet. Almost immediately upon stepping down as prime minister, Blair went out to make the rounds in the region.

It is beginning to look, however, as if Bush wanted to host the conference to distract attention from the administration's failures to pay serious attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict for more than six years. The president gave little indication that he had a creative and serious agenda for the conference, including acknowledging that he had given Blair limited authority about its terms and aims.

On another level, the Arab League, for the first time in its history, dispatched an official delegation to Israel to meet and discuss prospects for peace. In the Arab world, gestures are frequently as important as substance. That the meeting took place at all was significant despite the fact that the Arab League's publicly stated position was extreme and its delegates were representatives from Egypt and Jordan, both countries that have already made peace with Israel.

In the inscrutable Saudi world, there have also been developments that raise more questions than they answer. The United States announced, after many months of discussions, including with the Israelis, that the administration was proposing a $20 billion arms deal to the Saudis and the Gulf States over the next 10 years. This came despite the fact that the Saudis apparently have been actively undermining U.S. military, diplomatic, and political initiatives in Iraq; have continued to fail to seriously scrutinize major terrorist banking activities in Saudi Arabia; and have totally failed in their recent efforts to bring Hamas and Fatah into a stable governing arrangement.

In Israel, Prime Minister Olmert now appears to have weathered the initial aftermath of the Winograd Commission report and will not have to address the balance of the commission's findings for several months. Olmert and his Kadima Party now have time to improve their public standing, especially on the peace process, prior to entering an election cycle that Olmert is now seen likely to be able to defer at least until 2008.

With respect to peace negotiations, the Israelis appear to be jockeying with the Syrians as to whether there might be grounds to restart talks. At the same time, the new deputy prime minister, Haim Ramon, launched an old gambit toward the Abbas-Fayyad Palestinian government. His suggestions, much along the lines of the proposal made by then Prime Minister Ehud Barak, even include borders similar to those rejected by Yasser Arafat in 2000. Politically, this had the domestic consequences of taking the air out of any similar proposals that Barak, as the new head of the Labor Party, might be considering now or during the run-up to future elections. In addition, it permitted the Olmert government to placate international and domestic critics by appearing to move ahead on the peace process, despite the continuing Hamas-Fatah turbulence.

At the same time, Israel continues to deal with mounting rhetoric from Hizbullah in Lebanon and continued tension and clashes with Hamas' forces along the Gaza Strip. At least the United Nations' peacekeeping force in South Lebanon appears to be more active than its predecessor, sustaining casualties while trying to keep the border quiet.

In the South, the Egyptians appear to more engaged than ever in controlling the traffic and flow of people into and out of Gaza. That suggests a growing concern in Cairo of a more radical "street" — something that the Mubarak government hopes to quash at all costs. Almost as if this is its deal with Hamas, Egypt seems to be carefully monitoring human traffic while not taking any serious steps at reducing arms passing into Gaza.

All this activity is unlikely to produce any constructive results in the near or intermediate future. Preoccupation with Iraq, Iran, and now arms deals suggests that the administration in Washington is once again only going through the motions. In Jerusalem, except for trying to move the Iran issue to a higher place on the international agenda, Israel's leaders also are willing to let matters fester. Neither strategy is very constructive or productive.