Winning the war, then negotiating and securing peace

Dr. Gilbert N. Kahn
professor of political science at Kean University in Union.

In his address on Monday night to the Israeli people, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert got it right in describing an expanded ground operation over the next few days. The goal is to drive Hizbullah forces back to the Litani River before a cease-fire is essentially imposed. Olmert will then instruct the military to stand in place and await the arrival of an international peacekeeping force. He will have demonstrated to his country and the world that Israel cannot be attacked with impunity and that those who do attack Israel will suffer the consequences — even if Israel must endure significant casualties.

This decision, following up on the Israeli missile attack on Sunday on the Lebanese town of Kana, constitutes the beginning of the end of the 2006 Lebanon War against Hizbullah. Regardless of how justified Israel’s attack on Kana might have been, the number of civilian casualties made any reasoned debate over the attack irrelevant. By the time the world will be ready to discuss rationally the events at Kana or the attack on the South Lebanon headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon, the shooting phase of the war will be long over.

Olmert’s decision and the attack on Kana presage the forthcoming UN debate and international pressure to arrange a cease-fire. With its expanded ground effort, Israel hopes by then to demonstrate that it indeed has won the war. Hizbullah may well claim victory, but Israel should be able to just swallow hard, knowing that, one hopes, it will have delivered a serious blow to Hizbullah/Iranian designs and desires.

In this light, it is incumbent that attention be paid to the terms of the cease-fire and the nature of any peacekeeping force. It must be understood that wars rarely bring satisfactory resolution to either side, despite the justice, in this instance, of Israel’s cause. This cease-fire must have certain redlines with the rest of the negotiable issues. For example:

• Israel must receive its two kidnapped soldiers back unharmed but may have to devise a formula for freeing Arab prisoners who include the elderly, women, those without blood on their hands, or those who have served at least 15 years.
  
  
• Israel will demand compliance with UN resolution 1559, but it may well have to be amended to include at least a reevaluation of the Har Dov (Shebaa Farms) area.
  
  
• Israel will want Hizbullah’s forces totally disarmed, but it may have to settle for an international/ Lebanese army policing Hizbullah.
  
  
• Getting a UN force in place will not happen overnight. Israel will have to accept that Hizbullah will receive some military supplies while the international force is constructed, outfitted, and implemented.
  
  
• The international community will need to determine the extent of blame it is prepared to place on Syria and especially Iran, as it refocuses its attention on the need to impose international sanctions on Iran.
  
  
• And Israel will have to determine the terms of any givebacks to Hamas in exchange for the return of Gilad Shalit, while Hamas will have to decide whether it wants to resolve its issues with Israel over the kidnapped soldier before, after, or as part of the Hizbullah agreement.

At the same time, the international community must accept a set of variables as it considers a new, more aggressive approach to international peacekeeping. These include:

• It has never established a serious, sizable (“robust”) international force like that being contemplated by both the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization community. The numbers of this international force must be substantial, reaching, and, as many have recommended, at least 20,000 strong.
  
  
• The size and the mandate of the force must be agreed upon and accepted by the Syrians as well as Israel and Lebanon.
  
  
• Monies have to be provided for the maintenance of the force for the foreseeable future.
  
  
• All parties must accept that this force will have the power to intercede, to interdict, and to respond to all violations of UN resolutions and bilateral understandings.
  
  
• The peacekeeping force must force all military, paramilitary, and terrorist groups out of civilian population sites.
  
  
• The force must work to turn South Lebanon over to a viable Lebanese army and to remove all Hizbullah’s military forces from the south, as far north as Beirut.
  
  
• And the force must have the ability and the right to inspect and intercept all supplies moving into South Lebanon, and perhaps establish a presence on the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent arms shipments to Hizbullah.

The West will have to accept the fact that, unless it joins Israel in its efforts to neutralize Hizbullah, radical Islam will have won. The radical Islamists are asserting themselves not only against the Jews and Israel. It is the Europeans and the Christian world — without any clear solutions or recommendations as to how to address the worldwide threat from radical Islam other than appeasement — that stand to lose the most. As they lead the charge for a cease-fire, their enthusiasm is only exceeded by their naivete.

This war has changed the calculus once again in the region. Israel, not the United States, must define Israel’s threat from terror and Israel must reevaluate how far it is prepared to go as America’s surrogate. Radical Muslims must arrive at the conclusion that they have more to gain by talking than by fighting. The world must stop thinking it can engage in crisis management by using Band-Aids.