Bold steps — and dramatic missteps — on the march from Gaza to Lebanon

by Gilbert N. Kahn
professor of political science at Kean University in Union.

Over the past six years, Israeli governments have taken dramatic steps to improve the prospects for peace in the region. They did the right thing. They endured painful internal disruption, emotional dislocation, and international castigation. Unfortunately, the events of the past several weeks demonstrate two conflicting conclusions. First, Israel achieved very little for doing the right thing. Second, no Israeli government will move ahead again to make peace with the Palestinians or with the Islamic radicals unless there is a definitive change in the terms of reference to an unequivocal acceptance of Israel’s right to exist and the renunciation of terrorism.

When Israel withdrew all its forces from Lebanon, its hope was that the Lebanese government would stabilize its border with Israel and not permit Hizbullah to establish a pseudo-state in southern Lebanon. Not only did that not happen, but the Hizbullah militia became more heavily armed by its Iranian and Syrian patrons. In addition, the fragile, new, democratically elected Lebanese government includes several Hizbullah ministers, thus giving incomparable political cover to the most blatant terrorist group in the world after Al Qaida.

After Israel’s withdrawal, there were periodic firings of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, which Israel largely ignored or to which it gave only a mild response. In the interim, Hizbullah was reinforcing and upgrading its material and training. The attack against the Israeli patrol along the Lebanese border resulting in the deaths of four Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others precipitated the full-scale eruption, which has intensified on both sides with no immediate end in sight.

Significant blame for what happened rests with the world community for not forcing the Lebanese government to live up to UN Resolution 1559 and take over military control of south Lebanon. There was also a clear failure on Israel’s part in not responding and taking seriously every single Katyusha fired. If Israel had made it clear that following its withdrawal, it would not accept any attack on its territory and had responded immediately to any violation, it might have prevented the dramatic escalation.

Similarly, along the Gaza Strip, Israel failed, following the disengagement, to respond to the persistent shelling of Qassam rockets across the Green Line. If it had, the tunneling into Israel and the abduction of the Israeli soldier might never have occurred.

Once Israel entered the run-up to its election last winter, Ariel Sharon’s disability and Ehud Olmert’s struggle for electoral victory distracted virtually the entire Israeli defense establishment from firmly addressing the growing threats from Gaza and south Lebanon. This was coupled with the new Israeli government’s decision to entrust the defense establishment to its political partner, Labor, rather than trading Labor’s political chits for the treasury ministry. The politics of coalition-building overtook Israel’s security interests. The Kadima-led government entrusted the country’s strategic military planning to Olmert and Amir Peretz, two defense novices and political rivals. Lacking any experience to check or control them, they needed the institutional military leaders to guide them.

The dramatic military escalation also highlights the virtual non-involvement of the United States. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has not been in the region since November; special ambassador James Wolfensohn left months ago. The Bush administration’s road map has been reduced to a mere piece of paper.

While many friends of Israel believe that the Bush administration has been the best friend Israel has ever had in the White House, recent events may have given them pause. Good friends do not disconnect themselves from ongoing problems to let their friends solve them on their own. Having declared even before 9/11 that it did not want to be overly engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict and having become over-committed and absorbed in its own morass in Iraq, the United States left Israel and its neighbors to their own devices. Radical forces exploited the vacuum created by America’s absence.

Another voice that has been appallingly silent — except to call for “restraint” and “cease-fire” — is that of most American Christians. Nary a cry has been raised by the Christian communities on behalf of the Christian Arabs who once again are the doormats of the sectarian Islamic violence in Lebanon. Formerly, the Christian Maronites shared at least half the political power in Lebanon; they now are less than 40 percent of the population, many having fled or been driven out by the Islamic violence over the past decades.

Ironically, what Israel, and one hopes the world, will learn once both of the current battles are resolved is that there is no such thing as a “partial” or “interim” solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. For the Palestinians especially, the message is that there will be no agreement on the West Bank based solely on trust. Perhaps now the world may understand that making peace requires partners and that Israel will no longer endanger itself for peace only to have itself threatened by the very people with whom it allegedly is making peace.