The Gaza incursion as a test of wills — and Olmert
Ten months ago, Ariel Sharon disengaged Israel, the army, and more than 8,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and turned it over to the Palestinian Authority headed by Fatah. Early Wednesday morning, June 28, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered the Israel Defense Forces to enter Gaza for the purpose of securing the return of an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had been kidnapped by the military wing of the PA’s democratically elected government headed by the terrorist organization Hamas. Parsing these two sentences helps explain better than anything else what has happened in less than one year.
Israel is no longer being led by Sharon, a man of great controversy and complexity but with a wealth of national and international leadership, experience, extensive military knowledge, and political savvy. Now Israel is led by Olmert, who is feeling his way into the leadership role with limited experience and with a government that is officially in office less than two months.
The Palestinian people, meanwhile, are being led in the post-Arafat era not by a more moderate leader ready to make peace with Israel, but by an even more implacable foe, Hamas, explicitly committed to the destruction of the State of Israel.
Since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the Hamas rebels in Gaza, at a minimum, have been tolerating an intermittent rain of Kassam rockets on Israel proper. Instead of seizing the opportunity to follow the lead of their elected president, Mahmoud Abbas, and using the opportunity presented by the disengagement to create a viable political entity in Gaza, the Hamas leadership elected by the Palestinian people in January is using every opportunity to radicalize its population and to stir up hatred in the streets against Israel, while at the same time dismissing Abbas’ efforts. This despite the fact that Israel is no longer “occupying” Gaza, and an international community — led by the United States — is ready to do anything to facilitate the Palestinians’ transition into a viable country.
The events that immediately precipitated Israel’s move into Gaza — the disputed beach incident, Hamas’ decision to end its self-imposed “cease-fire,” the Kassam attacks, and the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier — were merely the triggers that set off Israel’s decision. Israel was faced with a need to demonstrate both at home and to the Palestinians that the country has by no means lost the will to fight against continued terror and provocations. In addition, the Israelis wanted to make clear their unwillingness to accept any invasion of their territory.
Tension between Fatah and Hamas security forces has been rising as the economic situation for the Palestinian people has been growing more desperate. For weeks, military contacts between the forces in Gaza have been exceedingly tense, with isolated combat occurring regularly. The political conflict, which had not been receiving as much public scrutiny, clearly has been festering as well. Only now, by directing their shared hatred toward Israel, can the various forces, despite some pious pronouncements, distract the public from their internecine conflict.
The Palestinian leadership has received limited international support for the escalation of violence represented by the attack on the Israeli military outpost at Kerem Shalom. While there will be a short-lived, positive response from the Palestinian people, as long as Hamas continues to confront the international demands vis-a-vis Israel, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will further deteriorate. Abbas may have good intentions, but as conditions worsen, the civilian population is likely to become more alienated and radicalized. At the same time, Hamas will certainly not be able to deliver, barring a dramatic political turnaround.
We have watched for several weeks as an Israeli government with an active left wing and a Labor leader, Amir Peretz, as a defense minister with no serious experience in either tactical or strategic defense trying to orchestrate a defense policy for the IDF. Peretz and Olmert, who also has limited military experience, have been compelled to rely exclusively on their commanders. As a result, decisions on the ground on the Israel-Gaza border were largely reactive —either passive or exceedingly aggressive.
Last week, as it faced its first major crisis, the new, untested Olmert government needed to assert an image of control in the eyes of the Israeli people, Olmert’s coalition partners, and his right-wing opposition. Olmert has to consider not only the immediate crisis but what his policy options might be once this phase is over. He needs to assess his professed commitment to the future “convergence” against the “I told you so” voices of those who opposed the 2005 Gaza withdrawal.
Ideologically, the radical Islamists can and will wait things out. Increased targeted assassinations by Israel, as some have suggested, are not likely to have a long-term impact. At the same time, further disengagement by the Israelis — except for some extremely remote settlements and hilltops — are unlikely. A third Intifada, with Arabs taking their fight to the street, would be met with a much faster and harder response by the Israelis this time around. International frustration with the absence of movement will not succeed in pushing Israel, at least until after the next presidential election in the United States.
Israel will not stay in Gaza. If Olmert successfully weathers this storm, he may get a chance to move ahead on other fronts, including the economy. He will also have shown his people and the Palestinians how he performs under fire. Abbas may resign, which in turn could send Israel back into the West Bank in force to prevent an outbreak of chaos and civil unrest, thus perpetuating the cycle of violence and bringing the region no closer to peace.
Comment | | |
All rights reserved