Olmert’s two-year plan: Mission impossible?
Ehud Olmert’s new government has set an approximately two-year clock in motion in its plan
to establish the permanent borders of the State of Israel. On the day after celebrating Israel’s 58th birthday, the new Olmert-led coalition government was sworn in with an articulated commitment to make permanent borders a clear priority. Olmert announced to the Israeli people, the Palestinian leadership, and the members of the “Quartet” (United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia) that this government will stand or fall on its pledge to continue the disengagement policy begun last summer by the Sharon government in Gaza by consolidating Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
Now it remains to be seen whether Olmert will meet this deadline and keep his commitment, and whether the Israeli public will tolerate these decisions, both emotionally as well as politically.
Olmert’s message to the Quartet was extremely clear. If the Quartet cannot eliminate the terrorist threat to Israel posed by Hamas and the Palestinian terrorists, persuade Hamas to recognize Israel, and bring Hamas to the bargaining table, Israel is giving notice that it will undertake a unilateral resolution to the territorial dilemma on the West Bank. The Quartet must either effect a drastic change of mind among the Palestinians or Israel will go it alone. The Israelis will complete its security fence, remove outlying settlements, and fix permanent borders.
As far as its relationship with the United States and President Bush, Israel may well be holding a major trump card. First, the 24-month window established by Olmert falls within the president’s second term, with a six-month cushion. From the Israeli perspective, given Bush’s overall sympathy for Israel’s cause over the past five-and-a-half years and uncertainty about who will replace him, there is a supposition that Israel should act during his watch.
Israelis understand well that Bush’s approval ratings are rock-bottom, and that any political success of which he can be part, domestic or international, can only improve his political standing.
As for the Palestinians, the solution is equally direct. The Palestinian leaders have 24 months to determine how and whether they wish to engage in a serious negotiated settlement — face-to-face — with the Jewish state. If the Palestinians want to proceed, there is ample time for them to get their own house in order and to proceed with negotiations. If the Palestinians were to renege on this proposal, Israel will have avoided being accused of having acted precipitously and abruptly in establishing final borders.
At home the new government is giving itself, the security establishment, and the military sufficient time to create the best possible strategy to extricate Jewish settlers from the West Bank. Disengagement or “convergence” from the West Bank, as it is now being called, will be much more complicated than from Gaza. It will be excruciatingly emotional and extremely polarizing. There is no easy way out for the Olmert government. It will need a comprehensive strategy; a politically acceptable program; top-flight, trained security personnel; and a reservoir of political support to weather what undoubtedly will be a heart-wrenching experience for the entire nation.
Olmert’s new government will have a very short-lived political honeymoon. He must solidify his coalition going into the disengagement by quickly addressing the demands for economic reforms and proceeding quickly with completion of the security barrier. He must also ensure that he has additional political allies in the Knesset ready to join the government, should some of the current members bolt the coalition when the actual convergence begins.
At the same time Olmert must demonstrate a willingness to expedite the movement of Palestinians — especially in and around Jerusalem — so as to decompress as much as possible some of the Palestinian and Israeli Arab hostility toward the Israeli “occupation.” Without compromising its security, Israel must now further cultivate those Palestinian leaders and reformers to try to establish a better modus vivendi.
This is an exceedingly tall order. With many new leaders in place and limited governing experience, especially in security matters, the government will have to deal with many of its own internal “confidence” measures before the real political confrontation that lies ahead in the next two years.
The Israeli political landscape is littered with political mines, and Olmert is a largely untested commodity. His first test on the international stage begins when the new prime minister visits Washington later this month. His trial at home has already begun.
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