Following weeks of suggesting that timetables and benchmarks only encourage the enemy, President Bush vetoed an Iraq funding bill and then insisted that he will continue to veto any others that Congress sends his way.

Now, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepares for her next trip to the Middle East at the beginning of next week, reports have emerged that the Bush administration has developed a novel idea for the Palestinians and the Israelis. As a way to bring the parties closer over the next several months, Washington has decided to urge both sides to meet certain benchmarks in specific time frames as a way to begin their serious direct negotiations.

Washington is pressing both the Palestinians and the Israelis to meet certain minimal goals within certain expressed timelines. The Israelis are urged to permit Palestinian buses to travel from Gaza to the West Bank with inspection procedures by the Israelis at both ends. They want the Israelis to allow more Palestinian goods to be processed through the Karni crossing and to remove additional West Bank checkpoints. This would permit the transfer of additional produce and other goods to flow from Gaza to the West Bank and allow Palestinians to travel more freely to friends and relatives.

At the same time, the United States has called upon the Palestinians to advance the coalition talks between Fatah and Hamas so that a united position acceptable to the United States and the Israelis is agreed upon. The United States is also insisting that there be a complete cessation of Kassam rocket firings from Gaza into Israel.

On the face of it, these goals are fine. The problem, other than the time frame, is that the benchmarks carry very different consequences and implications for the two sides. For Israel to permit increased travel and interaction is to leave open the potential for militants and suicide bombers to travel from Gaza into the West Bank, even if they are not themselves actually carrying any weapons.

For the Palestinians, their internal political negotiations ought to be a priori conditions for even entering the setting of benchmarks, and not an actual benchmark itself. Furthermore, assuming there was an agreement to cease the shooting of Kassam rockets from Gaza, at any time if such attacks were to be resumed, Israeli security would have been compromised by the potential crossing of dangerous leaders from Gaza into the West Bank.

The test for the peace process must demonstrate equivalency and accountability. If such measures are also designed to build confidence, then their failure must clearly not put one of the sides in a greater disadvantage than earlier. Political gestures must acknowledge security risks. Internal visibility and political consequences must bear similar weight on both sides. Israel cannot place itself in a position to suffer personal losses while the Palestinians only endure international indignation.

Perhaps a more honest set of moves would be a reasonable prisoner exchange, to be followed by some political agreements on both sides, and only then to be followed with genuine security measures. Bus travel might be opened initially only to women, children, and men over 50 until some level of regularity is achieved. One option also might be to insist that the Egyptians play an even larger role in managing the border and monitoring weapons smuggling into Gaza.

Of course, any moves on the diplomatic or security front must wait until Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's future is determined. In fact, Rice's decision not to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority on this trip reflects the obvious turmoil in the Israeli political situation.

If Olmert were to weather the storm whipped up by the Winograd report – unlikely in the long run – his or a new Israeli government could consider some of the benchmarks put forward by the United States.

All this suggests that, in terms of both process and substance, the Bush administration may be disingenuous in its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While seriously wishing the conflict be resolved, Bush and his team continue to believe that focusing on this crisis – and hopefully bringing some progress – may deflect public attention away from the real problems this administration is facing in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

In the last analysis, Bush also knows that with only 20 months left in office, the legacy of his administration is not looking very grand. If he can still achieve a breakthrough between the Palestinians and the Israelis, he may be able to gain some points in future history books. Ironically, if that occurs, it may be as a result of his successful use of the very device – benchmarks – that he is publicly rejecting elsewhere.