April 03, 2008
The U.S. State Department Web site recently posted a discussion question asking American diplomats whether they thought engaging Hamas is good or bad for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
PLO and Hamas representatives met in Yemen to discuss the possibility of reconstituting a Palestinian unity government (the talks proved abortive).
A growing Israeli lobby composed of figures from the Left and the Right is advocating an attempt by Israel to talk to Hamas.
Finally, Hamas appears to have survived the boycott imposed by the Quartet, Israel, and some Arab states, at least to the extent of generating widespread interest in a reassessment of the efficacy of the boycott policy.
That the boycott has failed is painfully obvious. The economic depravation of Gaza has not brought Hamas to its knees. Hamas is more popular than ever, not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank. There, the other half of the western/Israeli strategy — bringing prosperity and stability to persuade the population to support the Abbas-Fayyad leadership and reject Hamas — has also failed. Palestinians in the West Bank enjoy painfully little by way of prosperity and stability. Where they do see gains, the experience has not turned them against Hamas or made them enthusiastic supporters of President Mahmoud Abbas and the peace process with which he is identified.
The failure of the strategy of favoring the West Bank over Gaza in order to make the peace process attractive is but the latest in a 40-year series of abortive Israeli carrot-and-stick policies. These policies mistakenly assumed it was possible to significantly influence Palestinian political behavior through economic means. You’d think we’d have learned.
The latest Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll contained striking findings regarding rising support for Hamas and its leaders as opposed to Fatah and Abbas. Palestinian opinion polls have become a potent instrument for influencing policy. This is not always a good thing: Opinion polls, assuming they are accurate, are a snapshot reflecting the public’s reactions to specific events but not necessarily its inclination to respond to inspired leadership or breakthrough developments or, for that matter, the best policy options.
Indeed, were Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to produce a dramatic new framework for a peace agreement tomorrow, would this enable Abbas to rally Palestinian public opinion and win the day over Hamas? Probably not — after all, Hamas is not likely to give up power voluntarily and might not permit free elections in Gaza if the objective is to vote it out of power. Yet precisely such a development is the desired end product of the Quartet-Israeli-Abbas strategy. In this sense the strategy appears to have been flawed from the outset in its understanding of Hamas and that movement’s aims.
But a new peace agreement has not (yet?) been unveiled, hence we cannot unequivocally deem this approach a total failure. (In Israel, incidentally, the public would probably reject an Olmert-Abbas peace “breakthrough” at the polls; but that is another matter touching largely on Olmert’s perceived shortcomings as a leader.)
Yet even without the payoff of a peace breakthrough, the strategy appears to be coming apart at the seams. Broad international, Israeli, and Palestinian concern over the apparent failure of the current strategy appears to be growing. Hamas in Gaza has not been discredited; Abbas’ leadership has failed yet again; and Israeli outposts and checkpoints have combined with Fatah corruption, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s security lacunae, and American mismanagement to give the peace process a bad name. The latest Israeli security concessions in the West Bank are not likely to make a difference. Hamas, with Syrian and Iranian backing, can be counted on to sabotage progress.
It is indeed time to look seriously at alternatives. We need a new strategy, but the prospects are grim. Are Israel’s best options military or diplomatic? Do they lie in Damascus or Gaza City? Certainly, we should be wary of dramatic Israeli policy changes that further weaken Abbas, as long as there is any chance at all of a peace breakthrough.
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of Internet publications, where this article first appeared. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and a former special adviser to former Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
- Comment: comments@njjewishnews.com