January 17, 2008
President George W. Bush’s Middle East trip raised a number of critical questions, although none asked as frequently as that also asked in anticipation of the Annapolis, Md., summit: Why, after seven years, this sudden focus on trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict? As a corollary question, how did the Bush administration decide now that the road to regional peace, reduced terrorism, and democracy runs through Jerusalem?
The simplest, and most cynical, answer was that with only one year left in office, Bush is hoping to produce some foreign policy success. The Iraq War, much like the Vietnam War for President Lyndon Johnson, represents the event upon on which Bush’s place in history will be judged. If Bush hopes for a more favorable legacy, he needs to produce some major accomplishment even if it does not result in a final end to the crisis.
It seems, however, that the actual reason behind President Bush’s entry into the Israeli-Palestinian standoff is more complicated. Even assuming the surge has produced some successful results in the field in Iraq, there is little likelihood that the United States will withdraw and that peace, calm, and democracy will prevail in Iraq by the end of 2008. Furthermore, given the National Intelligence Estimate analysis on Iran, it is highly unlikely that there will be broad support for aggressive U.S. action toward Tehran — despite all those, in the United States and abroad, who question the validity of the report.
In the Middle East only the international energy crisis seems to be attracting the Bush administration’s attention. This is being driven not by any apparent concerns for global warming and/or by the need for safe, alternative sources of energy, but rather because the administration wants to assure American business a secure, unceasing flow of Middle Eastern oil.
For the Bush administration, this desire for greater political stability in the region gains specific support not only from the president’s economic advisers but also from the Pentagon as well as the State Department. For the State Department, a renewed focus on regional stability and energy permits it to revert to a leadership role in seeking to swing the administration back to a more “evenhanded” approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Defense Department, it provides the military with a legitimate distraction from what it is resigned to admit has been a military failure.
The most curious question is what specifically persuaded the president to shift not only his actions but also his rhetoric in his approach to the peace process. It is probable that this switch came as a result of a fully orchestrated approach developed by the Saudis’ and the other oil-producing Gulf interests.
Saudi Arabia’s major weapon remains oil. Its fear is Iran and the concomitant terrorism. The Saudis’ demand is that the United States now must play ball in the region their way. They are concerned that nothing happen in the region that undermines their dominance in oil production. Thus, say the Saudis, Iranian designs on Iraqi oil must be thwarted, regardless of how the United States may seek to ultimately resolve its involvement. The Saudis still fear an Iranian nuclear weapon and are not prepared to accept anything less than either elimination of the threat or nuclear parity with Iran.
To maintain leadership in the Arab world and to push for its designs, the Saudis agreed to attend Bush’s conference in Annapolis on specific condition that the United States would abet the Saudi demand to sustain its regional control. One result is Bush’s embrace of the Arab world’s absurd mantra that “all roads to regional peace and stability lead through Jerusalem.”
Bush’s turnaround in finally pursuing a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict does not emanate from an animus toward Israel. A U.S. return to engagement on this issue was long overdue.
What ought to be of concern is that the motivation is misguided. Eliminating terror, protecting national economic needs, creating regional stability, and forcing Iran to reenter the world of nations will not emerge from resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinians themselves, for example, need to reconcile all of their internal hostilities and develop at least a rudimentary, viable, governmental structure before actual discussions between Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert can reasonably be expected to produce the outline for a two-state solution. All the substantive and rhetorical flipping in Washington and demands within the Arab world will not make it happen.