by Dr. Gilbert N. Kahn

January 1, 2009

Unlike in Lebanon in 2006, this time, one hopes, the Israelis will get it all right. Israel’s military operation in Gaza seems to have been based on excellent intelligence. The international response appears, at the very least, to comprehend the civilian threats that Israel has endured and tolerated. The Bush administration is standing behind Israel, giving the incoming Obama administration a very difficult stance to modify.

Israel’s “friends” in the Arab world, as many of them did initially after the invasion of Lebanon, do not appear to be very upset to see Israelis beating up the radical forces of Hamas.

Even the Israeli political cynics have kept amazingly quiet, avoiding spinning the attack on Gaza as a political move by desperate forces determined to block Benjamin Netanyahu from winning in the February election.

Militarily, Israel responded with surprise, with cunning, and with force in response to the repeated attacks against its southern towns, attacks that intensified after Hamas opted not to extend its cease-fire with Israel. Israel’s Security Cabinet apparently acted upon a long, well-planned strategy, and with definitive intelligence that permitted Israel to gain the upper hand during the first phase of fighting.

There is a likelihood that some diplomatic and political wins, as well as military gains, may be forthcoming as well. While seeking neither permission nor acquiescence, it appears that Israel informed not only the Bush administration but also the Turks, the Egyptians, and the Jordanians. This outreach suggests the possibility that different alliances against fundamentalist or pro-Iranian radicals might be possible for the region in the future.

Tactically, Israel realized that it only had three weeks left before a predictable Bush administration would be replaced by an untested and unpredictable set of Obama policy-makers. Israel assumed that it was in a much better negotiating position with a new administration in Washington that will inherit the crisis in Gaza, rather than handing it a sudden test. It also made it easier for the new Obama operatives to continue or modify a policy set by the Bush administration, rather than needing to confront an Israeli-Arab confrontation head-on during their first days in office.

Still, there is the potential for some real downsides. The release or return of Israeli captive Gilad Shalit is less likely than ever. Whether Israel’s intelligence advantage can be maintained in a prolonged incursion is not clear. How heavy will the casualty toll be on both sides, and for how long will the international community restrain itself from demanding an end to the combat?

Israel also recognizes the political as well as military consequences, especially in its relations with the Palestinian Authority and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas will undoubtedly be under extreme pressure from his own backers as well as Hamas leaders on the West Bank to cease any movement or political discussions with the Israelis. No doubt, the Palestinian Authority, like the Bush administration, realized that there would be no real movement until after a new Israeli government is formed following the Feb. 10 elections. As a result of Israel’s moves, however, Fatah-led forces on the West Bank may well be in an even more precarious situation. Abbas now will also likely have to postpone Palestinian elections, from a suggested date scheduled to be announced Jan. 9 to some time later.

Perhaps even more serious for Israel is the likelihood of increased suicide bombers trying to enter Israel not only from Gaza but also from the West Bank.

Finally, there are possibilities that radical elements from Hizbullah might seek to infiltrate into Israel to create even more serious mischief. Attacks might be launched against any Israelis within the Green Line or even more easily against settlers in the territories.

On the political front, Netanyahu seemed to have lost one of his most important campaign planks against the current governing coalition — that Israel was weak and afraid to fight the Hamas threat in the South and to protect its citizens. Ironically, for the outgoing and disgraced Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, it gave him a small chance to revise his place in history which had been largely degraded by his failures in the 2006 war against Hizbullah in Lebanon.

As is the case so often in politics, timing is everything. It will remain to be seen if in this case Israel may have timed the nature and character of its response effectively and efficiently.

Dr. Gilbert N. Kahn is a professor of political science at Kean University in Union (e-mail gkahn@kean.edu).

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