Learning from failure
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January 13, 2010
Toward the end of our conversation about his new book, I asked veteran “Track II” diplomat Stephen P. Cohen if he remains hopeful about peace in the Middle East.
Even for someone with a habit of measuring his words, Cohen paused for a long time before answering.
“I’m feeling a little hope now,” he said, “more than I felt a few months ago.”
In some ways, Cohen is in the hope business. As a citizen diplomat, he brokered the first secret official negotiations between Israel and the PLO, serving as midwife to the Oslo process that brought Israelis and Palestinians tantalizingly close to a peace deal. He’s given advice to Anwar Sadat and Shimon Peres, Bill Clinton and Colin Powell.
But the hope business has fared about as well as the economy over the past decade. The Second Intifada and 9/11, suicide bombings and Qassam rockets, wars in Lebanon and Gaza — you know the story. In his new book, Beyond America’s Grasp: A Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East (Farrar, Straus and Giroux), Cohen tries to make sense of what went wrong.
I spoke to Cohen at his house in Teaneck (full disclosure: Steve is a neighbor and fellow congregant) and asked why he opted for the long view — issuing report cards on successive American presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama.
“Because the United States is getting deeper and deeper into the Middle East, and every president who has gotten engaged is either stubbing his toe or falling on his face,” he said. “It is important to have a perspective on how we got there.”
It also demonstrates, he said, America’s tendency to oversimplify the Mideast. Asked for an example, he refers to Obama’s Iran policy, which Cohen sees as a far subtler approach than that demanded by the president’s critics.
Wherever he looks, Cohen sees governments, leaders, and citizens missing the point.
In his book, for example, he writes that Europeans are making the “terrible historical error in thinking they can ally themselves with the forces attacking and undermining the United States and the Jews rather than assuming the role of reconciliation and higher understanding of the issues.”
The Europeans, he told me, “feel so overtaken by the United States because of basic hard power — the military — they do not realize their possibility is to deal with the problem with soft power, to deal with the emotional, ideological, and religious relationship between the West and the Middle East.”
“Soft power” is Cohen’s niche. His training is in social psychology, not political science. That makes him an easy target for those who think Arabs or Muslims only understand the language of force, and that those who disagree are dupes.
“Yes, you mostly have to attack them,” is how he sums up the attitude. “That is the basic understanding that is very widespread, and it fails to make the crucial distinction between Al Qaida and where most Islamic countries and people are, who are very distant from Al Qaida and their ideology.”
Cohen calls this view of Islam “a huge mistake.” “It is a mistake strategically, because the only way we defeat the radicals is by strengthening the moderates against them,” he said.
I ask him where, in his travels as president of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development, he sees signs of moderation in the Muslim world.
He talks about his role as a member of the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World in 2003. Meeting with Muslims in Africa, he said, he noted there was “one thing that young Muslims wanted — what they call American-style education.
“This was a very big desire,” he said. “That’s one example that was very widespread.”
Among Palestinians, however, other desires take priority. Oslo failed in large part, he writes, because of the PLO’s “virtual addiction to the politics of violence against Israel.” He has no illusion about Hamas. But he still senses a “sea change” among Arab leaders that is bubbling down to the street, and a feeling among Muslim elites that the door is fast closing on an opportunity to use the region’s wealth to restore Muslim cultural glory, as opposed to military prowess.
That’s only part of the hope he has begun to feel. He likes that Obama made the peace process a priority early in his administration and has a chance to learn from his obvious mistakes. He thinks Benjamin Netanyahu would like to see a peaceful settlement that includes Palestinians as partners. And he says the Iran nuclear crisis is deepening the relationship between Israel and the United States in a way that will bode well for restarting the peace process.
But a deal doesn’t mean peace, he said. For that, you need what he calls “reconciliation through resocialization.”
The term, he said, “refers to the attempt not to strike an immediate big political deal, but rather to help people have in their minds a variety of perceptions about the other — not to have a monolithic sense of them, to know that they’re real societies, not artificial.”
Andrew Silow-Carroll is Editor-in-Chief of the New Jersey Jewish News. Between columns you can read his writing at the JustASC blog.
“The only way we defeat the radicals is by strengthening the moderates” -- an interview with Stephen P. Cohen
Stephen P. Cohen is a social psychologist who has focused his career on citizen diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President of the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development, he helped broker first secret official negotiations between Israel and the PLO, served as a behind-the-scenes confidant of Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat in the launching of the peace process, and advised the George W. Bush administration on America’s relations with the Muslim world.
In his new book, Beyond America’s Grasp: A Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East (FSG), he writes what Kirkus calls a “big-picture overview of the long-teetering relationship between America and the Arab nations.” We spoke at his home in Teaneck, NJ on Jan. 11. The transcript has been edited for clarity. – Andrew Silow-Carroll
Andrew Silow-Carroll: Your book takes the history of Middle East Diplomacy back to the Wilson era. How is that helpful in understanding the way out of the mess we’re in right now?
Stephen P. Cohen: Because the United States is getting deeper and deeper into the Middle East, and every president who has gotten engaged is either stubbing his toe or falling on his face,” he said. “It is important to have a perspective on how we got there. Because it shows the complexities of presidents dealing with this issue and also shows that is very hard for a president to succeed as long as the American people have no understanding of this. They can’t support anything more complex than the simplest propositions, so we have to oversimplify our policies.
I’ll give you an example. The president is trying to do something a little more complex than usual in opening discussions with Iran. The obvious thing would have been for him to declare that Iran was a rogue state and to gradually build up hostility towards it. And then he would have been in a situation where he would have had to act militarily in a premature manner. And now he tried something more sophisticated in that he’s trying to talk to them not naively believing that they are going to be easily convinced to give up their nuclear program, but for a variety of reasons.
He understands the issues in the Middle East are very big in the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. They are very influenced by immigration, by oil sales, by investments of capital, and the truth is that also that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the remaining legacy, and it’s a big one, of the historic problem of the era, which is how Christians will deal with Jews and Muslims. This is a problem that Europe never resolved. The United States partly pulled issue out of their throats by creating Israel, buy supporting the creation of Israel, and by developing significant relations in the Mideast of its own. Still, Europeans hold America responsible for not solving its problems.
ASC: You write that Europeans are making the “terrible historical error in thinking they can ally themselves with the forces attacking and undermining the United States and the Jews rather than assuming the role of reconciliation and higher understanding of the issues.”
SPC I think that Europeans feel so overtaken by the United States because of basic hard power — the military — they do not realize their possibility is to deal with the problem with soft power, to deal with the emotional, ideological, and religious relationship between the West and the Middle East.
They haven’t faced the issue of the Jewish state effectively. They still too often satisfy themselves by moral criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Arabs which doesn’t do anything to solve the problem. Because the more it becomes a question of who’s to blame, the worse it gets.
ASC: You put a lot of merit in changing the religious dialogue, the emotional and psychological dialogue. That’s not a very popular approach, especially in the Jewish community, who seem convinced that force must be met by force.
SPC: Yes, “you mostly have to attack them.” That is the basic understanding that is very widespread, and it fails to make the crucial distinction between Al Qaida and where most Islamic countries and people are, who are very distant from Al Qaida and their ideology. We should remember that the real ideologist of Al Qaeda was Zawahiri. And where was he when he developed it? He was prisoner in Egypt because he was a collaborator with those who assassinated Sadat. You have to realize Sadat and [Ayatollah] Khomeini emerged in the Mideast at more or less at the same time, at the end of the ‘70s. And Sadat believed in the essential nature of the American connection -- and was willing to make peace. He also understood that when he made the promise of “no more war,” it was not only a promise to Israel , it was promise to his own people who were sick and tired of having their sons for years practicing to cross the canal to be shot by Israelis. So they were excited by “No more war” as least as much as the Israelis.
We now treat it as if all of the Muslim world is Al Qaeda, following the hard-line in relationship with the United States and Israel, and that is a huge mistake. It is a mistake strategically, because the only way we defeat the radicals is by strengthening the moderates against them. Because we are making the problem worse insofar that we convince Muslims we are contemptuous of all Islam and of the Prophet.
ASC: I think American Jews believe that elites in many Arab countries, as you put it, “have been among the most persistent and hostile actors in the war of ideas against a Jewish nation in the Middle East.” But you also write that “gradually elites in many Arab countries began to recognize the anger and resentment were not policies and that only a peaceful settlement could change that.” Is that still the case? Is there any hope that the elites are willing to help change the “street’s” attitude toward Israel?
SPC: What I describe in the book is that the actions of young radicals are so loud precisely because they want to overcome their sense of being invisible in the real world of the global economy. And therefore they have to do something that is very overt, very visible, very shocking in order to be seen. They are engaged in the shocking of the consciousness of Jews and Christians. Because their methods are not war-winning methods. They are attacks on civilian consciousness. Sometimes they kill a lot of civilian people, but mostly what they do is frighten people to not enjoy the advantages of living in the West. To not feel the freedom of movement, the freedom of speech, the freedom of travel, the freedom of education that makes the West worth living and exciting, and why so many Muslims want to come here.
ASC: What encounters in your travels and talks tell that despite this shock and awe that there is a Muslim world that’s willing to head in the direction you talk about?
SPC: First of all, I was on the on the US Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World in 2003 under the time of George W. as president, and Colin Powell as Secretary of State. And in this commission we traveled to many Muslim countries including some I’ve never been to – African countries like Senegal. And the interesting thing was that there was one thing that young Muslims wanted – what they call American-style education. This was an almost universal desire, which they knew that they couldn’t get such an education at home. That’s one example that was very widespread.
In the élites, we find that the business elites and large parts of the intellectual elites and newspapers and study centers no longer have excitement about the Arab-Israeli conflict. What they have is desire to get beyond that so they can build their societies. I would put it this way – the Arabs realized that in their oil wealth they have a once in a lifetime opportunity to remake the glory that they understood they had in the medieval period. If they use their money badly, and badly means investing it in weapons and wars that fail, they’re losing their only chance. It’s also true if they use their money on show projects as opposed to real development.
So many people that I talk to are very interested in the Arabs using this phase to get out of the old consciousness that their glory will come from defeating the West and instead that what they have to do is build the future and give their young people a chance for education, good jobs, and chance to compete on a world level.
When I first went to the Gulf countries and after the Multilateral Talks which stopped, there was more disappointment in Gulf counties than in Israel. Things were going in a way they thought was good for them and they thought they could escape from the danger that had emerged out of their wealth becoming a target for Arab radicals. That was very interesting thing to hear and I felt in many countries.
ASC: But what about the Palestinians? Are there signs that they are ready to give up what you call in your book an “incendiary mix of existential despair and fantasies of redemption by a military defeat of Israel”?
A: I think that that is very largely true. I can’t tell you that it is universal because there is Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Islamic Jihad is a pure terrorist organization. Hamas started out by doing more social welfare, but it became committed to the idea that whenever an Israeli killed a Palestinian, they would kill an Israeli in return. And that’s a fulltime job. And they brought about disaster for the people of Gaza. And the people of the West Bank know that and they don’t want to go through that.
Traveling and talking to people is not a random sample so I have to be cautious. Let me tell you that when I used to travel in the first decade of my travels I would encounter people who had real hatred for Israel. I heard things that I never believed I would hear – such terrible things. Now what you hear from Palestinians is anger, but not hatred. And their anger is directed at settlers, the settlement movement, very much. Not only – but a lot.
So I try to talk to a variety of people as well as leaders and it just feels to me that there’s been a big change since the days of Sadat. That even if he didn’t convince other Arabs to join him at that time, his direction of thinking is very widespread. Because look what happened to the “Three No’s” of Khartoum: They’re gone. The Arab summit put that to bed. It’s hard to for us to see that when we see car bombings and the terrorists blow up restaurants and dance halls. But that was a decision made by the senior summit.
ASC: Are they bringing their people along?
SPC: When you make a sea change it takes time for it to really sink in to people that you mean it and for people to internalize it. We wouldn’t expect from ourselves that things we are changing now would be done overnight. Remember how long it took before the traditional anti-Zionism non-Zionism in certain parts of the American Jewish world were overcome. A long time. Things change slowly.
When a leader makes his mind up, he does it dramatically. But the impact of it is in waves, both internally and externally.
ASC: You write of the Jewish community and the Palestinians that the conflict is a core aspect of group identity – what you call “self-definition by negation.” For the Jews at least, wouldn’t they happily give this up in exchange for some kind of guaranteed peace?
SPC: We’re invested in conflict. It would take a lot to convince American Jews that it is real, this peace process. And many would remain skeptical. We’ve had a lot of experience of the last 100 years of living with a lot of antagonism and it’s very hard to believe that it’s being overcome because we will find examples of it continuing to emerge. And there are enough examples.
ASC: What about in Orthodox shuls – I can’t imagine they’d be very receptive to your message that what we need is more understanding of the Muslim world and a mutual recognition of the hostile attitude on both sides.
SPC: I once had this kind of discussion in one of the very, very Orthodox shuls in Toronto. And some of the young people at that shul would have wanted to beat me up. Now I’ve had other experiences -- in Montreal I spoke in a number of Orthodox shuls and there were more moderate responses, and some criticism, but not this outright hostility. I think it is important for me from time to time to speak to such an audience and remember what people are feeling. I don’t want to be shielded from the existence of that as long a sit exists.
I also believe that I have to struggle against young people who are turning against the very idea of two-state solution, which is surprisingly often and makes me very upset.
ASC: In which direction are they turning away, from the Right or the Left?
SPC: I’m talking about the young people from the Left.
From the Right, it’s the classic Zionist argument between two-staters and those who think Israel shouldn’t give up any territory.
ASC: So you mean supporters of a bi-national state?
SPC: They’re not bi-nationalist. They just don’t think there is any room for a Jewish state. They think it a discriminatory idea. We had so much enthusiasm among young people about Israel certainly up to the 1967 war and beyond that. And to see that being suffocated by what is going on is painful to me. And it exacerbates divisions within Judaism as well. It divides Orthodox from Reform and others who are also looking towards a more peace-oriented effort by Israeli leadership.
ASC: In terms of the peace process – what can Obama do to change the game there and change the game here?
SPC: I think that the fact that he started dealing with this problem in his first months gives him an opportunity that no other president has had for a long time – that is that he can learn from his mistakes and go on and try again. He has more than one chance because he started early and can learn from what’s happened so far and try a different approach. I have a feeling that is percolating here now.
ASC: And on the Israeli side – does Netanyahu represent a step back or forward for the peace process? Does he represent the will of the Israeli electorate?
SPC: Bibi did not receive the most seats in the parliament, but he was able to put together a winning coalition. So I would say in many ways he represents th Israeli consensus. He is very interested in a free economy, private sector. I think he would like to see a peaceful settlement that he knows will include Palestinians – he doesn’t fool himself about that. He has to take a step that will cause great rumbles in his linkage to his coalition. I can’t say whether it will actually break it down.
ASC: Do you find yourself, on a scale form hope to despair, on one side of the spectrum or the other?
SPC: I’m feeling a little hope now, more than I felt a few months ago. I was set back by Bibi’s reaction to Obama’s Cairo speech. That he was so eager to use what seemed to be a kind of bogus argument that Obama didn’t want Israelis to have more children. And at that time I was also disappointed by the way Ehud Barak was leading the Labor Party, and I continue to be disappointed.
But I believe there is such a serious relationship now between the future of the United States and the future of Israel that is so accelerated by the Iran’s nuclearization program, that I can’t believe that an American president won’t at some point say, “We have to do something together, and the only reasonable thing to do is around the peace process.”
I know that most people think of Iran in terribly pessimistic terms. I worry a lot about what Iran is up to. And I believe that Obama has decided to deal with hat in a very serious manner, and starting to talk to them first of an attempt to make an agreement that is not based on the whole of Iranian policy. By moving their enriched uranium to Russia, it is not asking them to overthrow their relationship with Hamas or Hezbollah, or to overthrow their regime. We’re not going in by saying “all or nothing.”
There is a chance at some point they will see the benefits to the point where we will not have to take actions that ruin their economy, like a naval blockade. And I can’t believe that the Iranian people will tolerate another war like the Iran-Iraq war. That was a disaster. That was the main reason they got excited about nuclear weapons, where they’d never be in another position where they’d have to send waves of young men to be wiped out. I don’t think the Iranian people want to be humiliated by the U.S., but I don’t think they want to head themselves into a major military confrontation.
ASC: How do you describe your own role as an intermediary?
SPC: I use the term “Track II diplomacy.” Track II diplomacy is unofficial, partly academic, partly activist. An attempt to bring together people who are not talking to each other and to give them an understanding of each other that is hard to get when they don’t have real trusting conversations. And you hear different kinds of things when you are able to get into that kind of relationship. So I put a lot of emphasis into developing pretty intense relationships with some people in many countries and use those people in order to meet others, gradually getting to meet more and more influential people.
I see myself very much as a Jew doing this. I don’t pretend that I’m not and never did. My name is Cohen and that helps put aside any fantasies have on either side of who I am, and that’s good. It interests them that I spent a lot of time in Israel and can talk to them intelligently which I do and they often ask me to do so.
More recently I was asked to do so in Saudi Arabia, where I was invited to give a lecture to an elite group of Saudis, very influential people, who gathered together in a private home and listened to me talk about Israel and Israel’s internal life for an hour and a half. They had never heard a lecture about Israel’s internal life. They always heard about Israel’s conflict with the Arabs. I tried to explain the complexity of Israeli religious life and cultural life. They were genuinely interested.
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